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I. INTRODUCTION
In the realm of large scale infrastructure projects that span the
international boundaries of the United States, the law presently fails to
openly designate a body of government that bears the approval power. In
the absence of definitive legislation in the area, the executive exercise of
this approval power at the presidential level likely falls within the bounds
of constitutional permissibility that is established by congressional
acquiescence. However, Congress retains the unimpeachable power to
dictate change by legislation, and indeed it should do so in order to
establish a consistent and transparent approval regime, while also
ensuring adequate environmental review.
The permissibility of the current executive exercise of the approval
power and the desirability of legislative intervention in this area are
evidenced in the proposed Keystone XL pipeline.
A. History of the Keystone Pipeline Project
Before determining whether to provide a permit for construction of
the Keystone pipeline, on November 10, 2011, the Obama administration
announced that it would undertake further environmental review of the
proposed project in light of unified environmental opposition. The fate of
the proposed pipeline will likely define President Obama’s legacy on
environmental policy and stewardship.
The practical effect of this announcement was to defer the
permitting decision beyond the 2012 presidential election and therefore
to place the issue outside the immediate political consciousness of
Americans. In short, President Obama punted on the most important
environmental decision yet to come across his desk. The Republican
congressional leadership responded by attaching a provision to a payroll
tax cut and unemployment benefits extension bill that required the
President to issue a decision on the Keystone XL permit application
within sixty days of the bill’s passage. President Obama signed that bill
into law as Congress went into holiday recess on December 23, 2011.1
He then obliged by denying the permit application on January 18, 2012,
stating that the law’s restriction did not allow the necessary time to
complete further environmental review.2 On February 27, 2012, the
pipeline builder announced its intention to submit a revised application
for a presidential permit to authorize the construction of the Keystone
1. Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-78, Title V, 125 Stat. 1279,
1289-91 (2011).
2. Statement by the President on the Keystone XL Pipeline, Office of the Press Secretary, The
White House (Jan. 18, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/01/18/statem ent-president-keystone-xl-pipeline.
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XL pipeline.3 With President Obama’s re-election now secured and John
Kerry likely to be confirmed by his Senate colleagues to the Cabinet post
soon to be vacated by Hillary Rodham Clinton, the renewed matter of the
Keystone XL pipeline appears poised to come before Mr. Kerry’s State
Department and Mr. Obama’s White House in 2013.
The Keystone Pipeline System is a network of pipelines designed
for the delivery of heavy synthetic crude oil from the tar sands of
northeastern Alberta into the United States. While the tar sands hold
hydrocarbon resources of enormous value, so-called “tar sands oil” has
been decried by environmentalists because of the large-scale surface
destruction that its extraction entails and because this extraction is energy
intensive and therefore generates high levels of greenhouse gas
emissions.4 This source consequently yields a lower net energy return
than conventional sources of crude oil.
After a series of corporate acquisitions, the project is now solely
owned by the TransCanada Corporation. TransCanada has designated the
development of the Keystone Pipeline System into four phases, two of
which are now operational and two of which are currently in progress.
Phase I comprises the original Keystone Pipeline, which stretches 2,147
miles from Hardisty, Alberta, through the Canadian provinces of
Saskatchewan and Manitoba before entering the United States and
traversing the Dakotas to arrive at Steele City, Nebraska.5 From there the
pipeline cuts through the northeast corner of Kansas and crosses the
breadth of Missouri to reach refineries at Wood River and Patoka,
Illinois. Because this pipeline crosses the international frontier with
Canada to enter the United States, it requires, under Executive Order No.
13,337, the grant of a presidential permit.6 Such a permit was granted on
March 17, 2008,7 and the pipeline commenced operation in June 2010.8
Phase II of the Keystone Pipeline System, the so-called “Cushing
Extension,” entails a simple three-hundred-mile extension from Steele

3. John M. Broder, TransCanada Renewing Request to Build Keystone Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 2012, at A13.
4. See Robert Kunzig, The Canadian Oil Boom, NAT’L GEOG. MAG., Mar. 2009, available at
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2009/03/canadian-oil-sands/kunzig-text.
5. See Keystone XL Pipeline – Overall Route Map, TRANSCANADA CORP., http://keystonexl.com/keystone-xl-pipeline-overall-route-map/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
6. Exec. Order No. 13,337, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,299 (Apr. 30, 2004).
7. State Department Grants Keystone Permit; Work to Start in Q2, DOWNSTREAM TODAY,
Mar. 17, 2008, available at http://www.downstreamtoday.com/news/article.aspx?a_id=9385.
8. Press Release, TransCanada Corporation, Keystone Pipeline Starts Deliveries to U.S.
Midwest (Jun. 30, 2010), available at http://www.transcanada.com/5407.html.
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City, Nebraska, to the oil transit juncture at Cushing, Oklahoma. This
extension became operational in February 2011.9
Phases III and IV constitute the ambitious “Gulf Coast Expansion,”
which is the subject of the current Keystone XL controversy. Phase III
will include an extension of the pipeline from Cushing, Oklahoma, to
America’s greatest concentration of refining capacity on the Gulf Coast,
near Houston and Port Arthur, Texas.10 On March 22, 2012, Barack
Obama stood in the Stillwater Pipe Yard at Cushing and stated the
intention of his administration to “fast-track” the construction of this
segment of the Keystone pipeline network.11 Phase IV includes a
doubling of TransCanada’s cross-border capacity by the construction of
another pipeline from the source at Hardisty, Alberta, to the terminal at
Steele City, Nebraska.12 This pipeline would, as currently proposed, enter
the state of Montana from the Canadian province of Saskatchewan and
cross into the northwestern corner of South Dakota. The pipeline would
proceed in a southeastern direction across South Dakota and through
Nebraska’s sensitive Sand Hills region and the massive Ogallala Aquifer
en route to Steele City.13 Phase IV of the pipeline system, with its
proposed border crossing from Saskatchewan into Montana, is the
subject of the current controversy.
B. The Cross-Border Pipeline Permitting Process
Executive Order 13,337 does not require the preparation of an
environmental impact statement (EIS). However the State Department’s
implementing policies indicate that, in the event of a presidential permit,
the department will undertake to perform an EIS in conformity with the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).14 The State
Department favored the granting of a presidential permit for the
Keystone XL pipeline in its final environmental impact statement (FEIS)

9. Press Release, TransCanada Corporation, Keystone’s Cushing Extension Begins Deliveries
to Oklahoma (Feb. 8, 2011), available at http://www.transcanada.com/5641.html.
10. Press Release, TransCanada Corporation, Keystone Gulf Coast Expansion Approved (Mar.
11, 2010), available at http://www.transcanada.com/5109.html.
11. Obama Fast-Tracks Part of Keystone XL Pipeline, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/0322/Obama-fast-tracks-part-of-Keystone-XLpipeline-video (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
12. Art Hovey, TransCanada Proposes Second Oil Pipeline, LINCOLN J. STAR, Jun.
12, 2008, http://www.downstreamtoday.com/news/article.aspx?a_id=11336&AspxAutoDetectCooki
eSupport=1; see Keystone XL Pipeline – Overall Route Map, supra note 5.
13. Keystone XL Pipeline – Overall Route Map, supra note 5.
14. Fact Sheet: Applying for Presidential Permits for Border Crossing Facilities (Canada),
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF W. HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS , http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/20
09/114990.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
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of August 26, 2011.15 However it was in response to allegations of
inadequacy of the FEIS that the Obama administration gave the order for
further environmental review in November of 2011.16 This action
prompted the Republican-controlled Congress to attach the sixty-day
requirement to the then-pending legislation, which in turn prompted the
Obama administration to deny the permit application in January 2012.17
Under the authority of Executive Order 13,337 dating from the
presidency of Lyndon Johnson and under color of the “inherent foreign
affairs powers” that have long been settled to vest in the presidency, the
executive has delegated to the State Department the duty of granting or
refusing permits for certain infrastructure projects that would traverse the
international boundaries of the United States.18 Amongst these are
proposals for oil pipelines.19 The Supreme Court of the United States
recognizes the privilege of the President to enter into “executive
agreements” or “executive settlements” with foreign sovereign powers
whose terms may alter the rights and remedies of American citizens by
simple virtue of presidential supremacy in the realm of foreign affairs.
However, the “inherent foreign affairs powers” do not appear to
contemplate an executive privilege to enter into similarly binding
arrangements with private foreign parties. Furthermore, insofar as the
presidential permit power has historically been exercised over certain
facilities entering into the United States, the presidential power is limited
to the approval or disapproval of the physical border crossing itself.
Finally, federal courts are divided as to whether an FEIS issued in the
course of a presidential permitting constitutes a final agency action or is
a presidential action immune from judicial review as within the “inherent
foreign affairs powers” of the President.
The Keystone XL pipeline and the Obama administration’s denial
of a presidential permit prompted a flurry of legislative activity on
Capitol Hill. Senator Hoeven of North Dakota introduced Senate Bill
2041 on January 31, 2012 with bi-partisan support.20 This bill allows

15. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE PROPOSED
KEYSTONE XL PROJECT 3.15 (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://keystonepipelinexl.state.gov/documents/organization/182070.pdf [hereinafter Proposed Keystone XL Project FEIS];
see also Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Keystone XL Project; Public
Meetings, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,525 (Aug. 26, 2011).
16. John M. Broder & Dan Frosch, U.S. Delays Decision on Pipeline Until After Election, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2011, at A1.
17. Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-78, Title V, 125 Stat. 1279,
1289-91 (2011); Statement by the President on the Keystone XL Pipeline, supra note 2.
18. Exec. Order No. 13,337, supra note 6.
19. Pub. L. No. 112-78 at § 2(a)(i).
20. S. 2041, 112th Cong. (2012).
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Congress to declare that the State Department’s FEIS of August 2011,21
which analyzes the proposed pipeline, shall be accepted,22 thereby
superseding and effectively terminating the Obama administration’s
renewed environmental inquiry. Furthermore, this bill explicitly
authorizes TransCanada to proceed in its construction of the pipeline,23
thereby superseding the presidential permitting process of Executive
Order 13,337. The bill also proposes to severely restrict the scope of any
judicial review of legal questions relating to the authorization or
construction of the pipeline.24 The GovTrack archive reveals that the bill
died in Committee before the close of the previous session of Congress.25
Regardless of the fate of Senate Bill 2041, the bill is useful in
framing a constitutional question as to the proper roles of the executive
and the legislative branches. To begin, this article will evaluate a similar
instance of congressional intervention into the authorization of a
different oil pipeline project during an earlier age of energy anxiety. In
examining the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, it
emerges that Congress may intervene at its pleasure to alter the course of
environmental review of a particular project. Congress may also elect to
limit the scope of judicial review of such projects without offending the
due process and equal protection rights of affected citizens.
However, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act and its
treatment in the courts only begins the inquiry. Because the Keystone XL
pipeline would enter the United States across an international boundary,
this pipeline implicates the “inherent foreign affairs powers” of the
President and thereby the venerated separation of powers principles that
are deeply embedded in our Constitution. The text of Executive Order
No. 13,337, the instrument that delegates permit-granting power to the
State Department, must be briefly examined, along with the most recent
judicial treatment of such process as an executive privilege in the field of
foreign affairs. The history and evolution of the “inherent foreign affairs
powers” of the President will then be considered in order to discern their
outermost boundaries. The jurisprudence of the “inherent foreign affairs
powers” will then be applied to the exercise of such power under
Executive Order No. 13,337 in the case of the Keystone XL permit
application. This application shows that while the precise contours of the
“inherent foreign affairs powers” remain nebulous, the exercise of the
21. Proposed Keystone XL Project FEIS, supra note 15.
22. S. 2041 at § 1(a)(2).
23. Id.
24. Id. at § 1(f).
25. Overview, S. 2041 (112th): A bill to approve the Keystone XL pipeline project and provide
for environmental protection and government oversight, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congre
ss/bills/112/s2041#overview (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
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presidential permit authority as to the Keystone XL pipeline likely falls
within the bounds established by precedent and previously acquiesced in
by Congress.
Even where Congress has previously acquiesced in the power of the
President, Congress remains free to abrogate that earlier acquiescence.
Congress is vested of the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign
nations” and this clause grants to Congress a free hand in the area of
cross-border infrastructure permitting. 26 After establishing that Congress
is largely at will to do as it pleases, this article will conclude with a call
for modest legislative action by which Congress might exercise its power
to ensure a consistent and transparent permit processing regime for crossborder facilities. This action would end legal uncertainty in this area and
ensure proper environmental and judicial review of proposed crossborder facilities moving forward into the future.
II. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND THE SCOPE OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Senate Bill 2041 contains provisions that demand an inquiry into
the proper roles of the Executive and of Congress in granting permits for
cross-border infrastructure projects such as the Keystone XL pipeline.
The bill directs that “[t]he final environmental impact statement issued
by the Department of State on August 26, 2011, shall be considered to
satisfy all requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969”27 and that “any action taken [to implement the purpose of the Bill]
shall not constitute a major Federal action under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.”28 In its final portion, the Bill
provides that actions taken to effectuate the purpose of the Bill “shall
only be subject to judicial review on direct appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.”29 Senate Bill
2041 therefore raises two important threshold legal questions: first, is it
within the power of Congress to mandate approval of a particular
infrastructure project and in so doing to supersede the prior requirements
of NEPA as to that project, and second, is it within the power of
Congress to so severely restrict the scope of judicial review?
In answering these questions, it is useful to consider the legal
wrangling that surrounded an equally controversial pipeline project of
similarly vast proportions in an earlier time of energy insecurity.

26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
27. S. 2041 at § 1(b)(1).
28. Id. at § 1(e)(1).
29. Id. at § 1(f).
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A. The Lesson of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act
Large reserves of crude oil were discovered on Alaska’s North
Slope near Prudhoe Bay in 1969. In one of history’s ironies, the National
Environmental Policy Act30 of that same year was signed into law on
January 1, 1970, imposing rigorous requirements of environmental
review upon such large-scale infrastructure projects as the proposed
Trans-Alaska Pipeline. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline was to be built from
the North Slope to the ice-free port at Valdez with crude oil then be
delivered via tanker ship to terminals on the western coast of the United
States.31
While environmental groups and others brought legal actions
alleging inadequate environmental review, only one lawsuit threatened to
halt the mighty pipeline. That lawsuit simply alleged that the Secretary of
Interior overstepped his statutory grant of authority in issuing certain
right-of-way permits for the construction of the pipeline.32 On February
9, 1972, engaging in a strict exercise of statutory interpretation, the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed a district court ruling and issued an injunction against the
issuance of such permits.33
Congress reacted with force. After the brief Yom Kippur War of
October 1973 and the attendant reductions in oil output by Middle
Eastern producers drove energy prices to staggering levels, Congress
acted on November 16, 1973, to enact the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act (TAPAA).34 In the legislation, Congress unabashedly
declared its goal to “authorize[] and direct[]” that “the trans-Alaska oil
pipeline be constructed promptly without further administrative or
judicial delay or impediment.”35 The Act approved of and accepted the
FEIS that the Department of the Interior issued the previous year and
offered that “[t]he route of the pipeline may be modified by the Secretary
to provide during construction greater environmental protection.”36 The
Act further provided that authorizations for the pipeline system “shall not
be subject to judicial review under any law except that claims alleging
the invalidity [of the Act] may be brought within sixty days following its
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012).
31. For an excellent overview of the economic, political, social, and environmental context in
which the contentious debate regarding the Trans-Alaska Pipeline transpired, see JAMES P. ROSCOW,
800 MILES TO VALDEZ: THE BUILDING OF THE ALASKA PIPELINE (1977).
32. Wilderness Soc. v. Morton, 4 ERC 1467 (D.D.C. 1972).
33. Wilderness Soc. v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
34. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, §§ 201-206, 87 Stat. 576
(1973).
35. Id. at § 203(a).
36. Id. at § 203(b).
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enactment,” and that “claims alleging that an action will deny rights
under the Constitution . . . may be brought within sixty days following
the date of such action.”37 Lastly, the Act declared that review of any
order of a district court as to such a claim “may be had only upon direct
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.”38
B. Congressional Action to Limit the Scope of Environmental and Judicial Review is Constitutionally Permissible
At the time Congress enacted TAPAA, President Nixon had
recently signed NEPA into law, and the true impact it would bear on the
environmental policy of the United States government remained highly
uncertain. Environmental advocates were concerned at the frontal assault
to the new legislation posed by TAPAA. Many perceived TAPAA to be
nothing less than an existential threat to the legislation they had strived to
secure.39 Nonetheless, as a simple matter of constitutionally vested
legislative power, it is well settled that Congress is within its right to
exempt a particular project from NEPA’s safeguards of environmental
review by tailored and targeted legislation. While this issue was not
directly presented, the Supreme Court acknowledged this right in Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y.40 The Court noted TAPAA’s
declaration—that no further action under NEPA was necessary for the
construction of the pipeline—and found “the merits of the litigation
effectively terminated by this legislation.”41 While it may seem offensive
that a politically driven Congress may intervene to determine the
applicability of environmental safeguards that might ideally be applied
uniformly and dispassionately, this is the inevitable result. Because
NEPA, and all federal environmental controls, ultimately stem from
Congress, it necessarily follows that Congress may alter or amend the
applicability of such laws and regulations by subsequent legislation.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has long recognized the power of
Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This power is
generally accepted to derive from Article III of the Constitution, which
provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.”42 It logically follows that if Congress
is vested of the power to “ordain and establish” the trial and intermediate
37. Id. at § 203(d).
38. Id.
39. See ROSCOW, supra note 31, at 10.
40. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
41. Id. at 245.
42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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appellate courts, then it is necessarily vested of the power to designate
their subject matter jurisdiction. As early as 1856, the Supreme Court
wrote that “there are matters, involving public rights, which may be
presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on
them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which
Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of
the United States, as it may deem proper.”43
Because of the accepted congressional power to override NEPA
requirements and to limit the scope of federal court jurisdiction, where
the legislature authorizes a particular project, such authorization is likely
to withstand a constitutional challenge unless it can be shown that the
legislation’s restrictions offend fundamental notions of due process or
equal protection. The limited case law associated with the TAPAA’s
restriction of judicial review reveals that such is likely not the case. In
Izaak Walton League v. Marsh, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit noted that “[t]he protections of the Due
Process Clause are extended only when a ‘property’ or ‘liberty’ interest
has been threatened. But generalized environmental concerns do not
constitute a property or liberty interest.”44 The Supreme Court denied a
petition for certiorari in the Izaak Walton case.45 In Stop H-3 Ass’n v.
Dole, a citizens’ group brought an equal protection challenge to a
congressional authorization of a federal highway project in Hawaii.46 In
rejecting the challenge, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote “it is
simply not true that Congress may not create exemptions from generally
applicable statutes in order to authorize state-specific projects.”47
In the case of the Keystone XL pipeline and the proposed
authorization of that project in Senate Bill 2041, the case for an equal
protection challenge is weaker still. Unlike the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
and the Hawaii highway authorization, the Keystone XL pipeline is not a
“state-specific project,” and as such there is no argument that the
authorization would present a form of discrimination against the citizens
of a particular state.
Senate Bill 2041 is distinct from TAPAA because it limits review of
the project not to any “United States district court”48 but rather to “direct
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

43. Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1856).
44. Izaak Walton League v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
45. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Marsh, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
46. Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).
47. Id. at 1431 (citing the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153,
§§ 201-206, 87 Stat. 576 (1973)).
48. 43 U.S.C. § 1652(d) (2012).
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Circuit.”49 It is possible to argue that, because judicial review may only
be had in the District of Columbia, this restriction poses a procedural due
process issue of inadequate access to the courts or an equal protection
concern of disparate impact upon those who reside at great distances
from our nation’s capital. However, such arguments seem unlikely to
prevail.
III. THE “INHERENT FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS” OF THE PRESIDENT
Unlike the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, the Keystone XL pipeline
proposes to cross an international boundary. Under color and force of
Executive Order No. 13,337, this crossing implicates the “inherent
foreign affairs powers” of the President. Though there is little textual
support for this principle to be found in the Constitution itself, a certain
degree of power in the arena of foreign affairs has long been settled to
vest in the executive in what are known as the “inherent foreign affairs
powers” of the President.50 Perhaps the earliest, and certainly the bestknown, expression of sentiment in favor of this power was voiced by
then-Representative John Marshall. In the House of Representatives on
March 7, 1800, he referred to the President as “the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
nations.”51
Certain scholars consider that these powers derive from the
“Recognition Power” by which the President “shall receive Ambassadors
and other public Ministers.”52 Others simply point to the “Executive
Power” clause of the opening section of Article II53 as supportive of a
presidential power to enter into executive agreements and settlements.
While the textual origin of the “Recognition Power” may serve to
enhance the President’s authority in executive dealings to establish or reestablish relations with a foreign nation, there is no uniformly agreed
upon textual source of the inherent foreign affairs powers.
Notwithstanding the explicit provision in Article II for the involvement
of the Senate in treaty negotiations,54 courts have held that, where the
49. S. 2041, 112th Cong. § 1(f) (2012).
50. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 34-45 (2d
ed. 1996).
51. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (cited in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)).
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
53. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.”).
54. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (Stating that the President “shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.”).

134

Seattle Journal of Environmental Law

[Vol. 3:123

foreign affairs powers are properly exercised, executive agreements
entered into by the President carry the same force of law as a treaty
obligation consented to by the Senate and are to be accorded the full
force and protection of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.55
For the purposes of this inquiry, it is important to trace the judicial
trajectory of the foreign affairs powers over a fifty-year period beginning
in the 1930s. The seminal Supreme Court case recognizing the foreign
affairs powers came in 1936 in the case of United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp.56 In that case, an arms manufacturer challenged an
order issued by President Roosevelt who, acting within a clear statutory
grant of power from Congress, had banned the export of arms to certain
South American nations involved in a border and natural resources
dispute. Justice Sutherland wrote for the majority and enthusiastically
upheld the presidential order. In an opinion weighed heavily by his
political theory of international relations, Justice Sutherland wrote that
the Constitution governed only the power differential between states and
the federal government. He opined that foreign affairs powers could not
have been conveyed to the President by states that never possessed them
but rather that the foreign affairs powers vested directly in the federal
executive from the Crown at the time of the Declaration of
Independence.57 In his view, there was therefore nothing offensive to the
Constitution in the President’s broad exercise of foreign affairs powers;
the opinion suggests, without so stating, that the President might have
acted properly even in the absence of the statutory grant.58 CurtissWright has never been overruled and continues to be cited by those who
favor the robust presidential exercise of foreign affairs powers. However
its precise stare decisis effect remains somewhat uncertain.
Three years prior to the Curtiss-Wright decision, in 1933, President
Roosevelt entered into the Litvinov Agreement (or Litvinov Assignment)
with the leadership of the Soviet Union. The agreement called for the
prominent Soviet diplomat Maxim Litvinov to be involved in
negotiations.59 Under the terms of this agreement, the United States
formally recognized the Soviet Union while the Soviet Union transferred
to the United States its interest in a Russian insurance company, which
was situated in New York and had been nationalized in 1918 and 1919.60

55. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942).
56. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See DONALD G. BISHOP, THE ROOSEVELT LITVINOV AGREEMENTS: THE AMERICAN VIEW
17-22 (1965).
60. Id.
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The assets of the insurance company were to be used to pay claims of the
United States and its citizens against the Soviet Union.61
In a pair of cases that reached the Supreme Court after the CurtissWright decision, the Court upheld the executive agreement and wrote
that because it was not a treaty, Senate approval was not required. While
New York’s courts had refused to enforce the Litvinov Agreement, the
Court wrote in United States v. Belmont that “in the case of all
international compacts and agreements . . . complete power over
international affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot
be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several
states.”62 Justice Douglas wrote for the Court in United States v. Pink
that “[a] treaty is a ‘Law of the Land’ under the supremacy clause [of
Article VI] of the Constitution. Such international compacts and
agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have a similar dignity.”63 During
the 1940s and 1950s, Senator Bricker proposed a constitutional
amendment that would have eliminated the use of executive
agreements.64 No such amendment was ever enacted by Congress.
There are two cases of particular implication in the “inherent
foreign affairs power” inquiry as to the presidential permitting power of
Executive Order 13,337, which surfaced in the decades after the close of
the Second World War. These cases are significant because of the direct
manner in which the courts addressed the relative constitutional powers
of the executive and Congress vis-à-vis various foreign commercial
interests. These two cases are United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.65, and
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Henry Kissinger, Sec’y of State.66
In Guy W. Capps, the federal government brought suit against a
private businessman for breach of a contract. The businessman had
entered into the contract in order to comply with the terms of an
executive agreement previously reached between the United States and
Canada.67 Alarmed by several years of record potato crops in the United
States, the government pledged itself to a system of price supports in the
Agricultural Adjustment Act as amended by the Agricultural Act of
1948,68 under which it would purchase from eligible potato growers all
table stock and seed potatoes that could not be sold commercially at a
61. Id.
62. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
63. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942).
64. See generally DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST
OF EISENHOWER’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988).
65. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Va. 1951).
66. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
67. Guy W. Capps, 100 F. Supp. at 30.
68. 7 U.S.C. § 624 (2012).
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parity price. In furtherance of this policy the United States, through the
Acting Secretary of State, entered into an executive agreement with the
Canadian Ambassador whereby the Canadian government would only
grant licenses for the export of potatoes to the United States, where the
exporter could give firm evidence of orders for seed potatoes and where
the importer gave an assurance that the potatoes would not be diverted
for table stock purposes. The district court entered judgment for the
defendant, finding insufficient evidence that a breach of his assurance
not to divert potatoes had in fact occurred.69
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on
different grounds, looking rather to the validity of the executive
agreement itself.70 Within the Agricultural Act of 1948, Congress had
created a procedure by which the President could impose limitations on
imports where it was thought that such imports would render ineffective
or materially interfere with the price support program.71 Specifically, the
statute empowered the President to “cause an immediate investigation”
and to “impose such . . . quantitative limitations . . . as he finds and
declares shown by such investigation to be necessary.”72 The Fourth
Circuit found that the President had caused no such investigation, and
that “[t]here was no pretense of complying with the requirements of this
statute.”73 The court quoted the famous concurring opinion of Justice
Jackson in the case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer: “When
the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers.”74 The court then opined that
“[i]mports from a foreign country are foreign commerce subject to
regulation, so far as this country is concerned, by Congress alone.”75
The Supreme Court affirmed, but it did so by reinstating the
judgment of the district court and declining to address the validity of the
executive agreement.76 In its opinion, the Supreme Court wrote that
“there is no occasion for us to consider the other questions discussed by

69. Guy W. Capps, 100 F. Supp. at 32.
70. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff’d, 348 U.S. 296
(1955).
71. 7 U.S.C. § 624.
72. Id.
73. Guy W. Capps, 204 F.2d at 658.
74. Id. at 659 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
75. Id. at 660.
76. United States v. Guy W. Capps, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
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the Court of Appeals. The decision in this case does not rest upon
them.”77
Consumers Union also concerned the federal government’s efforts
to control commodity prices.78 As Japanese and European steel producers
were reborn from the ash of the Second World War and increased their
production capacities through the 1950s and 1960s, low-cost imports into
the United States threatened the viability of the American steel industry.
Officials of President Johnson’s State Department entered into direct
discussions with the private foreign producer associations from June to
December 1968. These discussions resulted in the communication of
voluntary export restraints by which “the Japanese and European
producer associations stated their intentions to limit steel shipments to
the United States to specified maximum tonnages for each of the years
1969, 1970, and 1971.”79
The Consumers Union brought suit against the Secretary of State in
the District Court for the District of Columbia, which entered an order
declaring that the Executive had no authority to exempt the voluntary
restraint agreements from the anti-trust laws. The court did however find
that the Executive could enter into agreements or diplomatic
arrangements so long as those undertakings did not violate legislation
regulating foreign commerce. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit found that the actions of the executive in
securing instant voluntary agreements were not a regulation of foreign
commerce and as such were not foreclosed to the executive by the
Constitution.80
As in Guy W. Capps, the court dedicated considerable attention to
the statutory law by which Congress had delegated to the President
considerable lawmaking power in the area. With the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, Congress granted to the President for a period of five years
considerable power over the imposition of import restrictions such as
tariffs and quotas as he deemed necessary to the expansion of America’s
trading activities.81 This privilege expired in 1967, before the State
Department entered into negotiations with the foreign steel producer
associations. However the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit found that the export restrictions were entirely voluntary in nature
and did not carry the force of law of a tariff or quota. As such, the Court
77. Id. at 305. The Fourth Circuit opinion invalidating the executive agreement was followed in
a U.S. District Court as recently as 1983. Swearingen v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo.
1983).
78. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
79. Id. at 138.
80. Id. at 143.
81. 19 U.S.C. § 1821 (2012).
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found that the restrictions fell outside the purview of the legislation and
were not prohibited to the executive.82 The Supreme Court denied the
Consumers Union petition for a writ of certiorari.83
Finally, no overview of the “inherent foreign affairs powers” is
complete without visiting Dames & Moore v. Regan, Sec’y of the
Treasury.84 In that case the Supreme Court upheld an executive
agreement entered into by President Carter with the government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran. After the seizure of the American Embassy in
Tehran and the holding of diplomatic personnel as hostages for more
than one year, the hostages were finally released in the waning hours of
the Carter presidency on January 20, 1981, pursuant to an agreement
entered into on the previous day. Under the terms of the agreement, “[i]t
is the purpose of [the United States and Iran]. . .to terminate all litigation
as between the Government of each party and the nationals of the other,
and to bring about the settlement and termination of all such claims
through binding arbitration.”85 On April 28, 1981, the petitioner filed an
action, alleging that “the actions of the President and the Secretary of the
Treasury in implementing the Agreement with Iran were beyond their
statutory and constitutional powers and . . . were unconstitutional to the
extent they adversely affect petitioner’s final judgment against the
Government of Iran . . . and its ability to continue to litigate against the
Iranian banks.”86 The Supreme Court looked to the International Claims
Settlement Act of 1949, which was promulgated with the dual purposes
of facilitating a pending executive claims settlement with Yugoslavia and
providing a procedure for the facilitation of such future settlements.87
Emphasizing the narrowness of its decision, the Court wrote that “where,
as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary
incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our
country and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that Congress
acquiesced in the President’s action, we are not prepared to say that the
President lacks the power to settle such claims.”88

82. Consumers Union, 506 F.2d at 143-44.
83. Id.; Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
84. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
85. Id. at 665 (citing the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, reprinted in 75 AM. J. INT’L. L. 422
(1981)).
86. Id. at 655.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 658.
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The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, established pursuant to the
agreement entered into by President Carter, continues to adjudicate
claims to this day.
A. Executive Order No. 13,337 and the Presidential Permit
The history and evolution of the presidential permitting power must
be examined in order to discern its outermost boundaries. Presidential
permits are a legal and historical peculiarity that originates in a
nineteenth-century practice. That practice began when the President
issued a permit for the landing of a submarine telegraphic cable upon the
shores of the United States.
The first cable from a foreign country arrived from Cuba in 1867
under the “supposed authority” of an act of Congress of May 5, 1866.89
The act granted a New York operator a monopoly license for fourteen
years to lay and operate cables between Florida and the West Indian
islands.90 The first direct exercise of presidential power came in 1869
when President Grant refused to allow the landing of a French cable by a
company to whom the French government had granted a period of
exclusivity over telegraphic communications by submarine cable
between France and the United States. After that restriction was lifted,
“the President’s objection was withdrawn,” and the cable was laid in July
1869.91
From this first grant in 1869, and during the terms of Presidents
Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, Cleveland, and Harrison, “it was held by
the Presidents and their Secretaries of State that the Executive has the
power, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to control the landing,
and, incidentally, regulate the operation of foreign submarine cables in
the protection of the interests of this Government and its citizens.”92 In
August of 1893, then-Secretary of State Gresham briefly reversed this
trend by declining to consider permit applications and wrote in a letter
that “[t]here is no federal legislation conferring authority upon the
President to grant such permission, and in the absence of such
legislation, Executive action of the character desired would have no
binding force.”93 However in 1896, after an injunction suit was brought
89. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. II 453-54 (1906) (citing
Letter from Mr. Freylinghuysen to the President (Jan. 27, 1885), Senate Doc. No. 122, 49th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1885)).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 461 (citing Letter of Mr. Richards, Acting Attorney-General, to Mr. Sherman, Sec’y
of State (Jan. 18, 1898), 22 Op. 13; For. Rel. 1987, 166)).
93. Id. at 460 (citing Letter of Mr. Gresham, Sec’y of State (Aug. 15, 1893), Senate Doc. No.
14, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1893)).
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by the then-Attorney General against the landing of a cable without
federal permission, Judge Lacombe wrote that the consent of the
“General Government” is required, and that “whether [such consent]
shall be granted or refused is a political question, and in the absence of
Congressional action would seem to fall within the province of the
Executive to decide.”94 In 1898 Acting Attorney General Richards wrote
to Secretary of State Sherman to express his opinion that “the President
has the power, in the absence of legislative enactment, to control the
landing of foreign submarine cables.”95
A dispatch to the American Ambassador to Great Britain in 1919
described the procedure for the granting of permits to land telegraphic
cables in the United States at that time as follows:
As there is no legislation of Congress at the present time governing
the subject, permits to land cables in the United States are granted
by the President, by virtue of his power as director of the relations
of the Government with foreign powers, and as Commander in
Chief of the Army and the Navy. The permit for license is granted
by the President through the Department of State, after negotiations
conducted by the Department of State with the diplomatic agents of
the country of the cable company desiring the permit to land; or in
case the cable company is an American company, with the officers
of the company directly.96

In 1920, the American Western Union Telegraph Company brought
a lawsuit against the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy to enjoin
them from alleged interference, under the guise of the Executive’s power
to control cable landings in the United States, in its collaborative actions
with the British Western Telegraph Company. Judge A.N. Hand
acknowledged the opinion of Judge Lacombe of twenty-five years earlier
but wrote that:
[I]n respect to the Western Union, which by the Act of July 24,
1866 “(supra [14 Stat. 44])” possesses a federal franchise covering a
business with foreign countries and regulated as to rates by an agency of the government created by Congress, it seems unreasonable to
hold that Congress has not occupied the field and legislated so generally in regard to this defendant that is has withdrawn it from the
94. Id. at 461 (citing United States v. La Compagnie Française des Câbles Télégraphiques, 77
F. 495 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896)).
95. Id. at 463 (citing Letter of Mr. Richards, Acting Attorney-General, to Mr. Sherman, Sec’y
of State (Jan. 18, 1898), 22 Op. 13; For. Rel. 1897, 166).
96. GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. IV 247-248
(Garland Publishing 1973) (1940) (citing Letter from Long, The Third Assistant Secretary of State
(Long) to Davis, the Ambassador in London (Davis) (Jul. 31, 1919), no. 324, MS. Department of
State, file 841.73/10).
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exercise of executive power in respect to foreign cable connections.97

The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment for Western
Union on March 10, 1921, and on May 27, 1921, Congress enacted the
so-called “Kellogg Act” to require a written license from the President
for the landing or operation in the United States of any cable that directly
or indirectly links the United States to any foreign country. Section 2 of
the Act provides:
That the President may withhold or revoke such license when he
shall be satisfied after due notice and hearing that such action will
assist in securing rights for the landing or operation of cables in foreign countries, or in maintaining the rights or interests of the United
States or of its citizens in foreign countries, or will promote the security of the United States, or may grant such license upon such
terms as shall be necessary to assure just and reasonable rates and
service in the operation and use of cables so license[d]; Provided,
That the license shall not contain terms or conditions granting to the
licensee exclusive rights of landing or of operation in the United
States . . . .98

Section 3 of the Act confers jurisdiction upon the District Courts of the
United States to enjoin the landing or operation of a cable in violation of
its provisions or to compel by injunction the removal thereof.99 By
executive order issued July 9, 1921, President Warren G. Harding
“directed that the Secretary of State should receive all applications for
licenses for the landing or operation of cables and, after obtaining from
any department of the Government such assistance as he might require,
should inform the President with regard to the granting or revocation of
such licenses.”100
By executive order issued July 13, 1939, President Roosevelt
authorized and requested the Federal Power Commission to “receive all
applications for permits for the construction, operation, maintenance, or
connection, at the borders of the United States, of facilities for the
transmission of electric energy between the United States and foreign
countries, and for the exportation or importation of natural gas to or from
foreign countries,” and to obtain the recommendations of the Secretaries

97. Id. at 251 (citing United States v. W. Union Telegraph Co., 272 F. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1921),
aff’d, 272 F. 893 (C.C.A. 2d, 1921)).
98. Id. (citing 42 Stat. 8 § 2 (1921)).
99. Id. at 251-52 (citing 42 Stat. 8 § 3).
100. Id. at 252 (citing Exec. Order No. 3,513, MS. Department of State, file 811.73/709 (Jul. 9,
1921)).
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of State and War before submitting a recommendation to the President.101
On August 16, 1968, President Johnson delegated similar duties for the
issuance of oil pipeline permits at our national borders to the State
Department in Executive Order No. 11,423.
Executive Order No. 13,337 was signed by President George W.
Bush on April 30, 2004, and is the current permutation of the claim to
executive authority that was first staked by President Lyndon B. Johnson
in the issuance of August 16, 1968.102 Under Executive Order No.
13,337:
the Secretary of State is hereby designated and empowered [as the
President’s delegate] to receive all applications for Presidential
permits, as referred to in Executive Order 11,423, as amended, for
the construction, connection, operation, or maintenance, at the borders of the United States, of facilities for the exportation or importation of petroleum, petroleum products, coal, or other fuels to or
from a foreign country.103

The Order further provides that the Secretary shall “[r]efer the
application and pertinent information to, and request the views of, the
Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Interior,
the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Transportation, the
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, [and] the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.”104 While the
Executive Order itself does not refer to any environmental legislation or
require any impact statements, the State Department provides, on its
website for permit applicants, that “[i]n processing permit applications,
the Department reviews compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969.”105
After review, the Secretary of State is authorized to grant or deny a
presidential permit based upon her determination of whether or not the
proposed project is in the “national interest.”106 Upon notification, should
any of the government officials listed above formally lodge a
disagreement with the Secretary’s determination, the Secretary “shall
refer the application, together with statements of the views of any official
involved, to the President for consideration and a final decision.”107

101. Exec. Order No. 8,202, 4 Fed. Reg. 3,243 (Jul. 15, 1939).
102. Exec. Order No. 11,423, 33 Fed. Reg. 11,741 (Aug. 16, 1968).
103. Exec. Order No. 13,337, supra, note 6.
104. Id.
105. Fact Sheet: Applying for Presidential Permits for Border Crossing Facilities (Canada),
supra, note 14.
106. Exec. Order No. 13,337, supra, note 6.
107. Id.
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Executive Order No. 13,337 opens with an invocation of the
“authority vested in [President Bush] as President by the Constitution
and the laws of the United States of America, including section 301 of
title 3, United States Code.”108 That statutory provision does not confer
any substantive power to the President from Congress, but only permits
the President to “designate and empower” the heads of executive
departments or agencies to perform “any function which is vested in the
President by law”109 or “which such officer is required or authorized by
law to perform only with or subject to the approval, ratification, or other
action of the President.”110 The source of power to which President
Bush reaches with this Order is the same to which President Johnson
turned in 1968 when he opened Executive Order 11,423: “WHEREAS
the proper conduct of the foreign relations of the United States requires
that executive permission be obtained . . . .”111 The source to which
President Bush reaches is the “inherent foreign affairs powers” of the
President.
B. The Current Scope of the Presidential Permit Process, While Constitutionally Uncertain, Probably Extends to the Case of the Keystone XL
Pipeline
The outermost boundaries of the “inherent foreign affairs powers”
in general, and of the presidential permitting power in particular, are
difficult to discern. In evaluating these powers as to the Keystone XL
pipeline, three issues rise to the forefront. The first issue concerns
whether or not the issuance of such a presidential permit is
constitutionally permissible. The second issue concerns the scope of the
protections afforded. The third issue concerns the availability of judicial
review of presidential permit grants and of the attendant environmental
safeguards.
1. The Foreign Affairs Powers Do Not Confer in the President the
Power to Legally Bind the United States in an Agreement with a Private Foreign Party
At first glance, the entirety of the presidential permitting process as
exercised toward the Keystone XL pipeline appears to be on
constitutionally tenuous ground. This is not for the simple reason that it
might permit an executive action to alter or extinguish rights and
remedies of American citizens. Such a reading of the law has been
108. Id.
109. 3 U.S.C. § 301(1) (2012).
110. Id. at § 301(2).
111. Exec. Order No. 11,423, supra note 104 (emphasis added).
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conclusively foreclosed by the Supreme Court in the cases that arose out
of the Litvinov Agreement with the Soviet Union and in the case of
Dames & Moore v. Regan that arose out of President Carter’s executive
settlement with the Government of Iran. During the course of the
Litvinov Agreement litigation, the Supreme Court specifically rejected
the due process claims of a petitioner, writing that the executive had not
extinguished the claims of private creditors against the Soviet
government but had only subordinated such claims to those of the United
States.112 The Dames & Moore court similarly suggested the petitioner’s
recourse to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.113 These sentiments
are reflected in recent opinions in lawsuits brought by holders of
Argentina’s defaulted debt where judges have reminded petitioners that
as against sovereignties, while they may have a right, they may not have
a remedy.114
Rather, the presidential permit power as exercised toward the
Keystone XL pipeline appears constitutionally tenuous because the
President is not empowered to enter directly into legally binding
agreements with a private foreign party. The Roosevelt administration
entered into the Litvinov Agreement in direct negotiation with a senior
diplomat of the Soviet government in the establishment of formal
relations with that country and therefore may have enjoyed the textual
cover of the President’s Recognition Power. Similarly, the Carter
administration entered into its agreement with a branch of the Iranian
government in order to secure the release of American hostages in
Tehran in a time of high crisis in our relations with that country. Such
affairs of state fall within the state-to-state form of traditional conduct of
foreign relations and therefore enjoy robust claims to legitimacy under
the “inherent foreign affairs powers” as recognized by the Supreme
Court.
In contrast, the presidential permit, while ultimately formalized via
diplomatic channels, is the result of direct communications and
negotiations between the executive branch and a private foreign party.
As such, the presidential permit process is highly factually analogous to
the Consumers Union case, which remains the law of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and which the Supreme
Court declined to review at that time.115 In the Consumers Union case,
112. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
113. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
114. See Gauchos and Gadflies: Creditors’ Decade-Long Battle with Argentina Shows Just
how Tangled Sovereign Defaults Can Be, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2011, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21533453.
115. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
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the court upheld the export restrictions agreed to by foreign steel
producers with the clear admonition that the agreements survived only
because they were voluntarily reached in good faith and were revocable
at will. In other words, the court upheld the agreements because they did
not carry the force of law. The necessary legal implication is that it does
not fall within the President’s foreign affairs powers to enter into legally
binding executive agreements with private foreign parties. This finding is
in stark contrast to the cases of executive agreements with foreign
sovereignties to which the Supreme Court has accorded the same dignity
and legal force, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, as
treaties entered into “with the advice and consent of the Senate.”
In the case of the presidential permit issued for Phase I of the
Keystone Pipeline System and the application currently under review for
Phase IV, neither the State Department nor the TransCanada Corporation
has acted under any pretense that the permit is not intended to carry the
full force and enjoy the full protections of the law in the courts of the
United States. To be assured of this, one need look no further than the
case of Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of State.116 In that case,
after the National Resources Defense Council brought suit against the
Department of State to challenge the adequacy of the EIS prepared
during the permitting process for Keystone Phase I, TransCanada
intervened to defend its legal interest in its presidential permit. When the
judge ruled, he accorded TransCanada’s presidential permit the same
protections as executive agreements entered into with the Soviet Union,
Iran, and many other sovereign nations. He ruled the presidential permit
to be immune from judicial review; he accorded to the presidential
permit the super-heightened protections of the privileges of the “inherent
foreign affairs powers” of the President.
In the Consumers Union case, Judge Leventhal wrote a spirited
dissent in which he disagreed with the majority’s factual premise that the
export restraints agreed to by the foreign steel producers were not
intended to carry the force of law.117 Judge Leventhal expressed some
general support for the President’s ability to negotiate with private
actors: “Presumably, diplomacy ordinarily comprehends negotiation with
officials of foreign governments, rather than direct negotiations with
foreign firms as here, but I hesitate to suggest that this constitutes an
absolute limitation on the President’s authority.”118 The Judge noted what
the scholar Louis Henkin has referred to as the foreign relations

116. Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2009).
117. Consumers Union, 506 F.2d at 146 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 148.
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“apparatus,”119 which “gathers a variety of commercial information in
foreign countries,”120 and continued that “this function inevitably
involves contact with foreign firms, whether or not their governments are
a conduit for communication.”121 Nonetheless, he rested his dissent on
his differences with the majority’s factual premise, necessarily
acquiescing in its legal findings that the executive cannot legally bind the
United States in agreements with private actors.
While the legal dichotomy that distinguishes the executive’s
negotiations with state and non-state actors as illustrated in these cases
seems to demonstrate the impropriety of a presidential grant directly to a
private entity, to peremptorily reach a conclusion on this basis would
disregard the particular legal and historical sources of the presidential
permit power.
The earlier practice of the executive conducting negotiations with
the diplomatic representatives of foreign sovereignties for the permitting
of submarine telegraphic cables seems a far departure from at least one
recognized source of the “inherent foreign affairs powers” in the
Recognition Power of the Constitution. The practice of the executive
conducting negotiations for the permitting of cross-border pipelines with
both a foreign nation’s diplomatic representatives and also its captains of
industry is a further departure still. Nonetheless, the State Department
permit application materials provide that “[c]onstruction generally
cannot begin until the U.S. and Canadian governments exchange
diplomatic notes specifically authorizing the construction.”122 Because of
this exchange of diplomatic notes, the permit application process is
distinguishable from the Consumers Union case in which foreign
industries negotiated directly with the executive without any
participation of their government whatsoever. This practice of
negotiation with private foreign parties under the auspices of their
diplomatic representatives appears to be of the same vein as the earliest
negotiations for the permitting of submarine telegraphic wires. For this
reason, the presidential permit process as exercised toward the Keystone
XL pipeline probably falls within the bounds of the “inherent foreign
affairs powers” as established by precedent and previously acquiesced in
by Congress.

119. HENKIN, supra note 50, at 46.
120. Consumers Union, 506 F.2d at 148.
121. Id.
122. Fact Sheet: Applying for Presidential Permits for Border Crossing Facilities (Canada),
supra note 14.

2013]

Abrogate the Acquiescence

147

2. The Foreign Affairs Powers Do Not Confer in the President the
Power to Approve a Cross-Border Facility’s Extension Beyond the
Border Crossing Itself
Under the terms of the Executive Order, “the Secretary of State is
hereby designated and empowered to receive all applications for
Presidential permits, as referred to in Executive Order 11,423, as
amended, for the construction, connection, operation, or maintenance, at
the borders of the United States, of facilities for the exportation or
importation of petroleum, petroleum products, coal, or other fuels to or
123
from a foreign country.” Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Kerri-Ann Jones, is
on the record as stating, during a visit to Nebraska, that “[w]e just really
are responsible for the part that comes over the border and goes to the
124
first valve.”
This statement is consistent with the language of a
different presidential permit, cited in Sierra Club v. Clinton, in which a
permit was granted for “[a] 36-inch diameter pipeline extending from the
United States-Canada border . . . up to and including the first mainline
125
shut-off valve or pumping station in the United States.”
In light of the cross-border context, the language of the permit and
the statement of Assistant Secretary of State Jones are consistent with the
history of the presidential permitting process in which permits were
granted for the landing of submarine telegraphic cables. Such “landing
permits” are, by definition, restricted to the utility’s point of entry into
the United States. In the case of such telegraphic cable landing permits, it
appears that the permitting power extended at most over the territorial
waters of the United States through which the cable passed. In one early
instance a permit was granted for a Canadian cable to traverse
approximately eighty miles of U.S. territory before re-entering Canada,
126
but that permit was expressly understood to be revocable at will.
The presidential permitting power therefore appears to be restricted
to the approval or disapproval of the physical border crossing itself. This
limitation is in line with the considerable deference that has been granted
to individual states in determining the route that the pipeline will take
across their territory. This deference explains, to an extent, the particular

123. Executive Order No. 13,337, supra note 6 (emphasis added).
124. Kevin Abourezk, State Department Official: States Govern Pipeline Routes, LINCOLN J.
STAR, Sept. 27, 2011, http://journalstar.com/news/local/article_daeff415-640c-5101-a7bf0b74d1901c4a.html.
125. Sierra Club v. Clinton, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1157 (D. Minn. 2010).
126. MOORE, supra note 89, at 464 (citing Letter of Mr. Sherman, Sec’y of State, For. Rel.
1897, 327-29 (Sep. 14, 1897)).
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solicitude for the concerns of Nebraska contained within Senate Bill
2041 as to its sensitive Sand Hills and Ogallala Aquifer.127
Despite this clear limitation on the scope of the permit, the State
Department has begun to prepare an EIS for the entire proposed route of
the pipeline. This raises constitutional questions of the judicial
reviewability of such an EIS, and the federal courts do not speak with
one voice on this issue.
3. A President’s Decision to Grant a Permit and an Environmental
Impact Statement Commissioned by the Department of State Might
Be Immune from Judicial Review
In 2009, the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) filed a
lawsuit against the Department of State in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia to challenge the Department’s grant of
a presidential permit for the construction of Phase I of the Keystone
Pipeline System. In Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of State, in
which TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP, intervened as a defendant,
the NRDC alleged that the State Department had violated NEPA by
issuing a presidential permit on the basis of an inadequate assessment of
environmental impacts.128 Upon motion by the defendants, the claim was
dismissed on the pleadings for the plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.129
In the complaint, the plaintiffs did not challenge the inherent
constitutional power of the President to grant permits for trans-border
facilities. Rather, the plaintiffs alleged that because in that case the final
decision was rendered by the Secretary of State without the President’s
involvement, it was not an executive decision but was rather an
administrative one and was, as such, subject to judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act. Judge Richard J. Leon dismissed this
argument, finding that the Secretary of State acted as the President’s
delegate under Executive Order No. 13,337 and that the decision
therefore enjoyed the deference of one made by the President himself.
Judge Leon wrote that “Defendants have amply documented the long
history of Presidents exercising their inherent foreign affairs power to
issue cross-border permits, even in the absence of any congressional
authorization,” and continued to find that “[w]here, as here, the President
… delegates his inherent constitutional authority to a subordinate agency
and that authority is not limited or otherwise governed by statute, the
127. S. 2041, 112th Cong. § 1(d) (2012) (permitting the State of Nebraska to determine, in
large part, the route of the Keystone XL pipeline through that state).
128. Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2009).
129. Id.
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agency’s exercise of that discretionary authority on behalf of the
President is tantamount to presidential action and cannot be reviewed for
abuse of discretion.”130 Though there is no higher court authority as to
challenges of presidential permits issued under Executive Order No.
13,337, Judge Leon did take note of the case of Tulare County v. Bush,
where the court dismissed a NEPA claim “because NEPA requires
agency action, and the action in question is an extension of the
President’s action.”131 In a companion opinion handed down the same
day, the District Court for the District of South Dakota reached
substantially the same result;132 it appears that the South Dakota court
awaited the ruling on this constitutionally charged issue from the District
of Columbia court before handing down its own ruling.
Similarly, in the District of Minnesota, the court upheld the grant of
a presidential permit against a constitutional challenge.133 However, the
deference accorded to the presidential permitting power in that court was
less than absolute. Departing from the rulings of the District of Columbia
and South Dakota Districts, Judge Frank of the District of Minnesota
ruled that a State Department issuance of an FEIS is not an executive or
presidential action, but rather is a final agency action subject to judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act.134 In deciding this case,
Judge Frank made note of an Eighth Circuit case,135 which in turn cited
the Supreme Court for the proposition that “an agency's decision to issue.
. . an [EIS] is a ‘final agency action’ permitting immediate judicial
review under NEPA” and the APA.136 Judge Frank wrote of the South
Dakota and District of Columbia opinions that “the Court respectfully
disagrees with those decisions insofar as they hold that any action taken
by the State Department pursuant to an executive order, and in particular
the preparation of an EIS for a major federal action, is not subject to
judicial review under the APA.”137 This division of authority remains
unresolved. Executive Order No. 13,337 does not mention NEPA or an

130. Id. at 113.
131. Tulare County v. Bush, 185 F. Supp. 2d 18, 29 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, 306 F.3d 1138 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
132. Sisseton v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D.S.D. 2009) (holding that the
grant of the permit is a presidential action not subject to judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act).
133. Sierra Club v. Clinton, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Minn. 2010).
134. Id. at 1157.
135. Id. at 1156 (citing Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 446 F.3d 808 (8th Cir.
2006)).
136. Ohio Forestry Ass’n. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998).
137. Sierra Club, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1157 n. 3.
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EIS.138 It is only in the State Department’s implementing practices and
regulations that the Department elects to perform an EIS for projects for
where a presidential permit application is submitted.139 It is not clear
how the Sierra Club court would have ruled if the State Department
instead performed no EIS at all.
As noted, the State Department’s requirement of an “exchange of
diplomatic notes” likely satisfies the prohibition against binding
agreements entered into directly with private foreign parties. However
the exact scope of the protections afforded by a presidential permit to
facilities that reach beyond the border crossing and the judicial
reviewability of attendant NEPA safeguards remain highly unsettled.
C. Congress is Constitutionally Authorized to Unilaterally Regulate
Cross-Border Facilities
Though difficult to evaluate in light of the uncertain contours of the
“inherent foreign affairs powers” as to the presidential permitting
process, it appears that the exercise of the power as to the Keystone XL
pipeline falls within the bounds established by precedent and previously
acquiesced in by Congress. However, the “inherent foreign affairs
powers” of the President are not the only implication of the Keystone XL
pipeline’s crossing of an international boundary that set it apart from the
earlier Trans-Alaska Pipeline. In TAPAA itself Congress does not clearly
establish the constitutionally enumerated power under which the Act is
brought, writing only that “it is the intent of the Congress to exercise its
constitutional powers to the fullest extent in the authorizations and
140
directions herein made.”
At least one observer has suggested that
Congress acted under color of its Article IV power to control public
141
lands.
Legislation brought to authorize or otherwise control the crossborder facilities contemplated by Executive Order 13,337 could be
brought under the broad congressional power “to regulate Commerce
142
with foreign nations,” and this is indeed the source to which Senator

138. Exec. Order 11,423, supra note 102, from which Exec. Order No. 13,337, supra note 6,
derives, was issued in 1968 before the enactment of NEPA.
139. Fact Sheet: Applying for Presidential Permits for Border Crossing Facilities (Canada),
supra note 14.
140. Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 203(a), 87 Stat. 576 (1973).
141. The Hon. Peter H. Dominick & David E. Brody, The Alaska Pipeline: Wilderness Society
v. Morton and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 23 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 364 (1973)
(citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3) (“The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”).
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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When Executive
Hoeven reached in introducing Senate Bill 2041.
Order 13,337 was signed into force by President George W. Bush in
2004, the earlier language empowering the President to grant permits
144
only “to the extent that congressional authorization is not required”
145
had been removed. While this removal may be an accurate reflection
of the entrenchment of the presidential permitting power by
congressional inaction and acquiescence, the constitutional power of
Congress, where properly exercised, cannot be waived or amended in
time.
The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court reveals the Commerce
Clause to be perhaps the most expansive of the enumerated powers
conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. The Court has written that
“[t]he power to regulate commerce with foreign nations is expressly
conferred upon Congress, and being an enumerated power is complete in
itself, acknowledging no limitations other than those prescribed in the
146
147
Constitution.” In referring to the power as “exclusive and plenary,”
the Court expounded that “[a]s an exclusive power, its exercise may not
148
be limited, qualified or impeded to any extent by state action.” In a
2006 opinion by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that court
wrote that the Supreme Court has “never struck down an act of Congress
149
as exceeding its powers to regulate foreign commerce.”
There may be some areas which are uniquely and exclusively within
the constitutional purview of the presidency so as to make them
impervious to a congressional wresting of control. In light of the
expansive reach that the courts have attached to the Foreign Commerce
Clause, the control of cross-border facilities embodied in the presidential
permitting power is not among them.
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD ACT WITHIN ITS CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO
ESTABLISH A TRANSPARENT PERMIT PROCESSING REGIME AND TO
ENSURE ADEQUATE ENVIRONMENTAL AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ALL
CROSS-BORDER FACILITIES
The purpose of the inquiry thus far is to firmly establish that
Congress is at will to do as it pleases with regard to cross-border
facilities such as the Keystone XL pipeline. As demonstrated by the

143. 158 CONG. REC. S165 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 2012) (statement of Sen. Hoeven).
144. Exec. Order No. 11,423, supra note 102.
145. Exec. Order No. 13,337, supra note 6.
146. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492-493 (1904).
147. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56 (1933).
148. Id. at 56-57.
149. United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006).
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treatment of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act in the courts,
Congress is free to exempt a particular project from previously enacted
environmental safeguards and to limit the scope of judicial review. The
jurisprudence of the Foreign Commerce Clause abundantly confirms
that, regardless of past exercises of presidential permitting power under
color of the “inherent foreign affairs powers” of the President, Congress
may legislate in the field, even to the point of occupying it entirely, at
will. Simply in the name of efficiency, there is great value to be had in
the elimination of the legal uncertainty that currently envelops the
permitting process. At present, Congress has not spoken as to the precise
outer limit of the executive’s power in the granting of presidential
permits for trans-border oil pipelines. As Napoleon is believed to have
said, where the law is not conclusively settled the tools belong to the man
that can use them.
Legislation targeted to entirely remove the consideration of the
Keystone XL pipeline from the purview of the presidency stands to
worsen rather than to improve the quality of environmental protection.
This is the case with the now-dormant Senate Bill 2041. Because the Bill
would mandate acceptance of a potentially flawed EIS and would restrict
the scope of judicial review, the bill would diminish the public’s faith in
the ability of Congress to ensure adequate environmental protection and
to keep the doors of our courts open to citizens who seek redress.
Additionally, by targeting a specific project, Senate Bill 2041 makes for
poor environmental and public policy. Rather than reducing the
uncertainty that presently characterizes the presidential permit process,
the bill would increase uncertainty by introducing the possibility that any
permits pending in the future may be co-opted by a fickle Congress.
Senate Bill 2041 would not abolish the presidential permit process but
rather leave it intact, thereby subjecting future projects to confusing ad
hoc decision making from two branches of government giving multiple
answers to the same question.
To prevent this confusion and increase efficiency, Congress should
enact legislation to establish a transparent and consistent permitprocessing regime for cross-border infrastructure projects. To accomplish
this goal, Congress should eliminate the uncertainty that currently
envelops the presidential permit process by either abolishing it entirely or
by affirming that the presidential permit power is restricted to the
physical border crossing. Additionally, Congress should remove grants
of permits that extend deep into the interior of the United States and also
the appropriate attendant environmental safeguards from a space in
which they might presently enjoy immunity from court scrutiny as within
the scope of “presidential” actions. Congress should include in such
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legislation robust provisions for the application of NEPA standards to all
permit applications and for the ability of affected citizens to challenge
the adequacy of such environmental safeguards in an open court of the
United States.
Currently, Congress remains free to override otherwise uniform
procedures in legislation targeted to a specific project. Some might argue
that even if Congress were to establish uniform and consistent
procedures for the evaluation of cross-border permit applications, these
procedures may have limited effect given that Congress remains, as it is,
perpetually free to disregard its own rules. Nonetheless, the
establishment of a permit-processing regime is an essential first step.
V. CONCLUSION
The presidential permit power and the “inherent foreign affairs
powers” of the President are enveloped in legal uncertainty. The lessons
of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline tell us that Congress has the power to act
with force in the authorization and regulation of certain infrastructure
projects. In the case of the Keystone XL pipeline, Congress, should it
choose to act, is supreme over the presidency. Here, Congress can avail
itself of the expansive grant of power that is the Foreign Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.
However this unbounded power of Congress must be exercised
judiciously. Congress should enact legislation either to clarify the
historical truth that the President’s permit-granting power is constrained
to the border crossing itself or to do away with the presidential permit
process entirely. Such legislation should clearly establish that pipelines,
including those that arrive via the international boundaries of the United
States, are subject to the full force of the NEPA regulatory regime, and
should expressly provide for the judicial reviewability of the adequacy of
all environmental impact statements prepared within the permitting
process. In this way, Congress can reduce legal confusion in this area.
Most importantly, Congress can do away with a peculiarity of legal
history that has paradoxically afforded a foreign energy infrastructure
company immunity from certain domestic environmental protection
laws.
By abrogating its earlier acquiescence in the power of the President,
Congress will ensure adequate and proper environmental and judicial
review of cross-border projects moving forward into the future.

